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Judge Raker taught us to advocate with intelligence and integrity
to ensure that the judicial system and our reputations are never
compromised. She continues to reach out to her students and
inspire us to reach our true potential, and for this we will be
forever grateful.

Judge Raker: There can be no doubt—you have touched many
students’ lives in a most meaningful and positive way! Thank you so
much for your many long-lasting contributions.
VII. TRIBUTE TO THE HONORABLE IRMA RAKER
UPON HER RETIREMENT
BARLOW BURKE∗
Judge Raker’s name appeared in the Maryland Law Reports long
69
before she became an attorney and a judge. Her husband had been
injured in an automobile accident around River Road’s intersection
with Seven Locks Road in Montgomery County, Maryland. Shortly
thereafter, a shopping center developer proposed the construction of
a center near that intersection.
The developer filed for an
administrative application for a special exception. This is a type of
land use permitted in the county code only with the special
permission of the county’s Board of Zoning Appeals, with a public
hearing required by the Board. The local residents were opposed,
and some appeared at the hearing. Now usually the testimony of
residents in such proceedings is vague, anecdotal, and politely
received, with little cross-examination. After all, what land use
attorney wants to be known as a person willing to harass residents
volunteering their time?
But Irma Raker was one of the opponents in this case. She
investigated the frequency of accidents on River Road, submitting to
the board “a detailed list of accidents which occurred in the
immediate vicinity of the River Road-Seven Locks Road intersection
70
during 1966 and part of 1967.” Her list included the exact date and
time, the day of the week, the location and the number of persons
killed or injured in each accident, and was accompanied by a diagram
of the intersection that showed the numerous cautionary traffic signs
∗ Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. LL.B.,
University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1996. LL.M., Yale Law School, 1970. S.J.D., Yale
Law School, 1977.
69. See Eger v. Stone, 253 A.2d 372 (Md. 1969) (discussing Irma Raker’s
involvement in a zoning dispute over a proposed shopping center).
70. Id. at 376.
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on River Road in front of the subject property. Over the objection
of the developer’s counsel, the Board admitted her statistics—twentyfive accidents, seventeen injuries and one fatality, ten occurring
within normal nine to five shopping hours—into evidence.
The Board denied the developer’s application, disapproving it in
part on the basis of Irma Raker’s testimony, but the circuit court
found insufficient evidence for doing so. The residents’ attorney
appealed, and in the court from which Judge Raker is now retiring,
the circuit court’s decision was reversed. In an opinion still regarded
by land use attorneys as precedent in Maryland, the court held that
the testimony of a traffic expert
. . . confirmed in part by testimony elicited on cross-examination
of the experts of the applicants as well as the testimony of Mrs.
Raker constituted sufficient evidence to make the matters before
the Board ‘fairly debatable’ so that its decision denying the
application for the special exception was not arbitrary and
capricious and the decision of the Board could not be successfully
challenged in court . . . .
This rule will be adhered to even if we were of the opinion that
the administrative body came to a conclusion we probably would
not have reached on the evidence. In the instant case, but for the
rule, we might well have reached the conclusion reached by the
learned lower court, but in enforcing the rule we are obliged to say
that reasonable persons could have reached a different conclusion
on the evidence so that the issues were fairly debatable, and hence,
the decision of the Board must be sustained.
The lower court, in our opinion, . . . in effect, disregarded Mrs.
Raker’s testimony on the ground that it was ‘hearsay’. We have
recently decided, however, that not only is hearsay evidence
admissible in administrative hearings in contested cases but that
such evidence, if credible and of sufficient probative force, may
indeed be the sole basis for the decision of the administrative
body . . . . In our opinion the testimony of Mrs. Raker was clearly
admissible in evidence and was of sufficient credibility and
probative force to support, at least, Mr. Thomas’ opinion that a
traffic hazard would arise as a result of the granting of the special
72
exception.

Hearsay? How dare they? Nonetheless, the standard for credibility
of lay witnesses in zoning cases, acceptance of citizen testimony as
establishing the basis for an application’s denial, and acceptance of
71. Id.
72. Id. at 376–77 (cited in Marc A. Greidinger et al., Survey: Developments in
Maryland Law, 1987–1988, 48 MD. L. REV. 785, 799 (1989)).
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hearsay in an administrative forum stand today as well-established
73
principles of land use law and procedure in the state. This was all
Judge Raker’s doing, and perhaps her reason (I don’t know for
certain) for attending law school. She enrolled at American
University the next fall, shortly after the opinion in Egar v. Stone was
handed down.
Judge Raker was a second-year student when I began teaching at
the law school. She was a student of mine in the fall of 1971, in an
elective course then entitled “Modern Land Transactions.” She was
part of a first wave of female students to hit the law schools of this
country in the wake of the women’s movement. Unlike later female
law students, Irma’s generation had often married, started a family,
and enrolled their children in elementary school. This created the
conditions in which their daytime hours were then free enough for
them to return to graduate and professional school. It was an
exciting time to teach, just as it must have been to teach in the postWWII period, when a wave of college bound veterans hit our
campuses using the GI Bill. Irma and her generation were motivated,
appreciated the opportunity to go to law school, and were eager
participants in class discussions.
The academic year 1971–1972 was my second year of law teaching
at American University, so I am not sure just how “modern” the
transactions were that we discussed in class. In any event, in the law
student parlance of the day, Irma “got the book” in the course—
meaning not that she had it thrown at her, but rather that she wrote
the best final examination in the course.
A Supreme Court Justice—Potter Stewart, I think—once said that
the job of an appellate judge is much like that of a student. Just as
students are required to take an examination after studying, an
appellate judge must spend countless hours after the oral argument
writing the opinion. So I am going to examine two of my former
student’s “examination papers” in this tribute.
Judge Raker has written brilliantly and extensively in her
74
75
principled dissents on death penalty cases, on the right to marry,
73. See, e.g., Tauber v. County Bd. of Appeals, 262 A.2d 513 (Md. 1970) (holding
that hearsay evidence is admissible in administrative hearings, and may in fact serve
as the sole basis for an administrative decision); Arnold Rochvarg, Hearsay in State
Administrative Hearings: The Maryland Experience and Suggestions for Change, 21 U. BALT.
L. REV. 1, 18 (1991) (discussing the role of hearsay evidence in administrative
hearings, and arguing that Maryland courts should adopt a uniform approach
towards the treatment of hearsay evidence).
74. See, e.g., Evans v. State, 886 A.2d 562, 584–85 (Md. 2005) (Raker, J.,
dissenting) (“We pay mere lip service to the principle that death is different and yet
continue to impose a lower level of certainty in the death penalty context than we do
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and in cases involving women’s rights. However, I am a teacher of
property and real estate subjects, about which she has written less
extensively. That’s not her fault: Judge Cathell and Judge Harrell
generally have the laboring oar in these cases. Nonetheless, when
assigned, she performs up to their exacting standards. (Over the
years, I have also learned to read the first paragraph or so of her
dissents. There she always goes to the heart of the dispute with the
77
majority and spells it out in trenchant terms. ) In addition, lest there
be any doubt, let me say that I would still award Judge Raker the “best
in class” award for the real estate transaction opinions I am going to
discuss. However, in the tradition of professional and professorial
analysis, and because she needs no more praise from me, I will be
analytical as well as laudatory.
A. Myers v. Kayhoe

78

This opinion resolved a dispute between a vendor and purchaser of
real property involving an interpretation of a financing condition in a
contract of sale. The Purchaser had paid a $2,000 deposit and a date
was set for closing, but time was not of the essence in the contract.
for other lesser important interests in Maryland.”); Miller v. State, 843 A.2d 803, 833–
50 (Md. 2004) (Raker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that in
order to impose a death sentence, a jury must find that aggravating factors outweigh
mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by a preponderance of the
evidence); Oken v. State, 835 A.2d 1105, 1158–74 (Md. 2003) (Raker, J., dissenting)
(“I would hold that portion of the Maryland Code . . . that provides that punishment
shall be death if the sentencing authority finds that the aggravating factors outweigh
the mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence violates due
process . . . .”); Borchardt v. State, 786 A.2d 631, 665–84 (Md. 2001) (Raker, J.,
dissenting) (“Evolving standards of decency cry out that, if a society is to impose
death as a penalty, it should do so on no less a standard than beyond a reasonable
doubt that the sentence is fitting and appropriate for the particular offender.”).
75. See Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 635–93 (Md. 2007) (Raker, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (distinguishing between the right to marry
and an entitlement to rights created by marriage).
76. See Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 501 A.2d 817 (Md. 1985) (involving a
property tax exemption case for a country club refusing to admit women as
members, heard by Judge Raker as a trial judge).
77. See Hemming v. Pelham Wood Ltd. Liab. Ltd. P’ship, 826 A.2d 443, 460–63
(Md. 2003) (Raker, J., dissenting) (“The entire basis of the majority opinion rests
upon inadequate lighting in the rear of the apartment building. The majority holds
that because the landlord provides exterior lighting . . . it had a duty to adequately
maintain that lighting. From this duty . . . the majority makes the unjustified leap in
logic that somehow the landlord is then responsible for violent criminal activity that
occurred within the demised premises and not within the common area . . . . The
only way the majority can reach their desired result is to cobble together the line of
cases in Maryland imposing a duty for liability for physical harm which occurred in
the common areas with the line of cases finding liability for demised premise damage
resulting from a cause originating in the common area. This is a novel theory,
unsupported by any authority or case law in the country.”).
78. 892 A.2d 520 (Md. 2006).
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The financing condition (paragraph 20 of the contract) provided:
Buyer agrees to make written application for the financing
herein described [in the next paragraph (number 20) of the
contract, calling for a 30 year mortgage loan for $245,000 at 7%
interest] within five (5) days from the date of Contract Acceptance.
If such written financing commitment is not obtained by Buyer
within thirty (30) days from the date of Contract Acceptance, this
Contract of Sale shall be null and void . . . and all deposits
hereunder shall be disbursed in accordance with the terms of this
79
Contract.

The next paragraph (numbered 21) of the contract “specified
conditions under which the requirements” of the preceding two
paragraphs “could be satisfied by alternate financing,” and provided
that “nothing in this paragraph shall relieve Buyer of the obligation
to apply for and diligently pursue the financing described” in the
80
preceding two paragraphs.
The purchasers filed one application, which was rejected.
Purchasers thereafter claimed that they had met their obligations to
pursue financing diligently and refused to go forward with the
contract. When the vendors objected and refused to return the
deposit, the purchasers sued for breach of contract and failure to
return the deposit. On cross motions for summary judgment, the
trial court granted the purchasers’ motion, ordering the return of the
81
deposit.
The court found that the contract was governed by an “objective
theory of contract interpretation, giving effect to the clear terms of
agreement, regardless of the intent of the parties at the time of
82
contract formation.” Here, the language that “buyer agrees to make
written application” would mean that a reasonable person would
assume that an indefinite article “a” was intended to precede “written
application,” meaning that the purchaser would make at least one
application. Therefore, the court held that the purchasers “would
only need to make one written application for the financing
83
described . . . .”
This express language, the court said, trumped the implied
obligation in every such contract condition to pursue the financing
spelled out in the contract in good faith and with reasonable
79. Id. at 524. This condition appears in the standard form drafted by the
Maryland Association of Realtors. Id. at n.1.
80. Id. at 524.
81. Id. at 525.
82. Id. at 526.
83. Id. at 527.
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promptness. An express term negates any such implied and
84
inconsistent duty.
B. Cochran v. Norkunas

85

In this case, Judge Raker decided that a letter of intent was an
86
agreement to agree and that the parties were not bound to it. Once
again, the discussion began with the rule that the contract was
87
governed by the objective theory of contract interpretation. Are you
hearing an echo of the last case here? Three of the five paragraphs
of the letter referenced the use of provisions in the standard form
88
Maryland Association of Realtors contract of sale. Judge Raker must
be an expert on this, right? The letter called for delivery of the
standard contract to the vendor within two days. That delivery
occurred and the vendor signed the contract, but did not return it,
leaving the letter as the cornerstone of the agreement between the
parties. Noting that the letter did not contain any promise to
negotiate open terms, and that it referenced at least three terms that
would have to be included in a final agreement, Judge Raker found
that there was no contract capable of specific performance on behalf
89
Meanwhile, instead of reviewing
of the prospective purchasers.
similar cases from other states, Judge Raker takes us on a trip through
the pages of the leading treatise writers on the law of contracts—Alan
Farnsworth, Samuel Williston, and Arthur Corbin—as well as the
Restatement of Contracts. She provides a summary of the law in this
area, dearly loved by real estate developers, though not by their
90
counsel.
These two cases have something in common. In each, Judge Raker
invokes the objective theory of contracts. She could have expanded
the duties of the purchaser in Myers, taking the “application”
language as signifying a duty to file an application, incorporated by
84. Id. Did not paragraph 21 make the implied obligation express? It referred to
“financing,” not an application and commitment, so does not that imply an
obligation on the purchasers to keep going, applying for another loan from another
lender? At least to keep going up to the 30 day time limit for obtaining a
commitment? No, Judge Raker must have thought, because the specific requirement
of “an application” again trumps a general requirement for “financing.” The
financing to which a good faith effort applies refers to the application’s terms.
Therefore, when it is filed, it must contain reasonable, market-driven terms—an
interest rate available in the market, a loan of a length offered by lenders, etc.
85. 919 A.2d 700 (Md. 2007).
86. Id. at 712–13.
87. Id. at 710.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 712–13.
90. Id.
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reference into the contract’s financing condition as representative of
the type of application called for, and then required that it be filed
repeated times. This is the sort of interpretation used, for example,
91
by courts imposing an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Similarly, she could have incorporated the standard form contract
into the letter of intent, finding that the parties had a reasonable
expectation that the letter would ripen somehow into a binding
contract. She took neither course. She did what practitioners of
“Modern Land Transactions” typically do—she let the documents
speak for themselves. She let the documents, not the surrounding
circumstances nor the expectations of the parties as they might be
shown outside the four corners of the documents, control.
So Judge Raker learned something long ago, in the Modern Land
Transactions course, and used her training well. No teacher could
ask more of a former student! By any “objective” measure, she has
been a great judge. Her law school is proud of her, and I am grateful
for her service to the judiciary of Maryland and to the profession. I
look forward to her sitting as a senior judge, specially assigned.
VIII. THE HONORABLE IRMA S. RAKER: A VALUED FRIEND
LINDA D. SCHWARTZ∗
When asked to write a few words regarding my personal reflections
on the Honorable Irma S. Raker, Judge of the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, in honor of her retirement from the Court, I must admit
that I hesitated before accepting the opportunity. This hesitation was
motivated neither by any reticence in my personal regard for her nor
by any lack of admiration for her professional talent; but rather, by
my heightened sense of privacy regarding our lengthy and close
relationship. But then it occurred to me that the personal side of
Judge Raker should be revealed and preserved along with her very
considerable professional accomplishments.
I remember vividly the first time that I met Judge Raker. She was
in the Law Review office efficiently marshalling a myriad of editorial
matters, and I was a new staff member who was struggling to figure
out what working on that journal was going to entail. She was
welcoming and warm, but also assertive and instructive. She had a
91. E.g., United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 681 P.2d 390, 427 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1984) (holding that where there are no contrary intentions, there is an
implied obligation to deliver marketable title on the part of the purchaser).
∗ Attorney-at-Law, Paley Rothman. J.D., American University, Washington College
of Law, 1973.

